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Abstract
It is well-known that selling different goods in a single bundle can significantly increase
revenue, even when the valuations for the goods are independent. However, bundling is no longer
profitable if the goods have high production costs. To overcome this challenge, we introduce a
new mechanism, Pure Bundling with Disposal for Cost (PBDC), where after buying the bundle,
the customer is allowed to return any subset of goods for their production cost. We derive
both distribution-dependent and distribution-free guarantees on its profitability, which improve
previous techniques. Our distribution-dependent bound suggests that the firm should never
price the bundle such that the profit margin is less than 1/3 of the expected welfare, while also
showing that PBDC is optimal for a large number of independent goods. Our distribution-free
bound suggests that on the distributions where PBDC performs worst, individual sales perform
well. Finally, we conduct extensive simulations which confirm that PBDC outperforms other
simple pricing schemes overall.
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1 Introduction
We study the monopolist pricing problem of a firm selling n heterogeneous items. For each item,
customers have a valuation, which is their maximum willingness-to-pay, drawn from a known dis-
tribution. A customer wants at most one of each item. The firm offers take-it-or-leave-it prices
for every subset of items, and the customer chooses the subset maximizing her surplus (valuation
for the subset minus price), with the no-purchase option always being available. We assume the
customer’s valuation for a subset is additive over the items in the set. The objective of the firm is
to maximize expected per-customer revenue.
In the full generality of the problem, the firm has 2n− 1 prices to set. However, it is important
to find profitable yet simple pricing schemes that are determined by a small number of prices. Two
such schemes are Pure Components (PC), where items are priced separately (and the price of a
subset is understood to be the sum of its constituent prices), and Pure Bundling (PB), the strategy
of only offering all the items together. A third scheme that generalizes both PC and PB is Mixed
Bundling (MB), which offers individual item prices as well as a bundle price for all the items. MB
can be seen as a form of price discrimination, where customers who highly value an item can buy
it for its individual price, while customers with lower valuations still have a chance of buying it as
part of a discounted bundle.
The efficacy of simple pricing schemes is of immense importance in retail, and has been studied
over the past few decades in the economics literature, the operations research/marketing interface
literature, and more recently, the computer science literature. For a single item, the solution is
immediate: choose the price p maximizing p(1 − F (p)), where F is the CDF of the valuation (see
[Mye81]). However, for two items, even if their valuations are independent, bundling can be better
than individual sales.
For example, suppose we have two products with IID valuations, each of which is 1 half the
time, and 2 half the time. If we sell the items individually, we can always get a sale for 1, or get
a sale half the time for 2. In either case, the combined expected revenue is 2. However, if we sell
the items as a bundle for 3, then the bundle will be purchased 34 of the time, yielding an expected
revenue of 94 .
The key observation is that the valuation of the bundle is more concentrated around its mean
than the valuation of the individual items, which causes less consumer heterogeneity, and we can
choose a price that is the highest willingness-to-pay for a larger fraction of customers. This makes
it easier to reduce deadweight loss, which is revenue lost from pricing a customer with positive
valuation out of the market, and consumer surplus, which is revenue lost from offering a customer
a better price than necessary.
The power of bundling is even greater when valuations are negatively correlated—consider two
products with marginal valuations that are uniform on [0, 1] but correlated in a way such that they
always sum to 1. In this case, offering the bundle at the price of 1 will always get a sale, extracting
the entire welfare, while selling the items individually yields at most 12 , half the available surplus.
These effects have long been known in the economics literature, following the pioneering work of
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[Sti63], [AY76], [Sch84], and [MMW89].
Of course, bundling is not always superior to individual sales—this is especially true once we
consider production costs. For example, suppose we have two goods with IID valuations that are
uniform on [0, 3], but each cost 2 to produce. Selling them individually at price 52 will yield a
profit of 112 per item and is better than selling them as a bundle—these are low-profit-margin items
that are only valuable to a small fraction of the population, and by bundling them we may force a
customer into consuming a good for which her valuation is less than the production cost.
Over the decades, a lot of work has been done to compare the profit of Pure Bundling versus
Pure Components. [AY76] write, “The chief defect of Pure Bundling is its difficulty in complying
with Exclusion,” where Exclusion refers to the principle that a transfer is better off not occuring
when the consumer’s valuation is below the producer’s cost. It is observed in [Sch84] for the case of
bivariate normal valuations that Pure Bundling is better when mean valuations are high compared
to costs. [BB99] prove that bundling a large number of goods can extract almost all of the available
surplus, but this is crucially dependent on the items being “information goods”, i.e. goods with
no production costs. [FN06] characterize conditions under which Pure Bundling outperforms Pure
Components for a fixed number of items, and all of their conditions imply low costs. [LFCK13]
define a measure of consumer heterogeneity that increases with costs, and present computational
results showing Pure Bundling performs poorly relative to Pure Components as their measure of
consumer heterogeneity increases.
The indisputable conclusion from all this work is that high costs are the greatest impediment
to the magic of bundling. However, we argue that there is a simple way to enjoy the effects of
bundling while allowing for the flexibility of individual sales—sell all of the items as a bundle, but
allow the customer to return any subset of items for a refund equal to their total production cost.
We call this scheme Pure Bundling with Disposal for Cost (PBDC). It is a strict improvement
of Pure Bundling where the customer’s valuations that were below the cost have been truncated
to equal the cost. Meanwhile, the firm is indifferent between producing an item for its cost or
returning its cost to the customer, but PBDC makes it easier to sell the bundle because customers
with low valuations for specific items won’t be priced out of the market.
Importantly, there is great flexibility in how to present PBDC to the customer in a transparent
and attractive way. In fact, we show that PBDC has a few equivalent formulations which can
already be seen in the market. One formulation is a tariff to enter the market, after which all
products are sold at cost. Alternatively, PBDC can be introduced with an individual price for each
item and a per-item discount for each item purchased beyond the first. From a marketing point of
view, the tariff strategy is more attractive when the number of items is large, while the discount
strategy is more attractive when the number of items is small.
Our scheme can be compared to that of [HC05], who recognized the need for a middle ground
between Pure Bundling and Pure Components. They introduced the scheme Customized Bundling,
which prices each bundle based only on its size, and not which items are included. [CLS08]1 perform
1See [CLS11] for the journal version.
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extensive numerical experiments for the same scheme, calling it Bundle-Size Pricing (BSP), showing
that it can extract 99% of the optimal profit in their simulations.
PBDC can be seen as orthogonal to BSP—while BSP imposes symmetric pricing across items
but allows non-linear pricing based on quantity, PBDC allows asymmetric pricing across items
based on cost but imposes additive pricing once the customer pays the tariff to enter the market.
When all item costs are identical, PBDC is a simplified version of BSP, because instead of having
n prices to decide, there is only one price to decide, be it thought of as the bundle price, the tariff,
or the discount. However, since we are able to relate PBDC to Pure Bundling, it is much easier to
analyze. Our work provides the first theoretical explanation for some of the empirical successes in
[CLS08]—indeed, in their simulations, costs are either equal, or insignificant (equal to half of the
product’s mean valuation).
We present two types of theoretical bounds in this paper. Both require that items have inde-
pendent valuations, which is a standard and often necessary assumption in the bundling literature.
Both also rely on a transformation from costs to negative valuations which as far as we know is
new.
First, we prove that PBDC, with an appropriately chosen bundle price, extracts the entire
welfare as the number of items approaches infinity, so long as the valuations have uniformly bounded
variances. This type of result is based on the law of large numbers, which says that the sum of
cost-truncated valuations, which we denote with the random variable X, lies within (1 ± ε)E[X]
with high probability. Therefore, the bundle price of (1 − ε)E[X] will be accepted by a (1 − ε)-
fraction of the customers, profiting almost the expected welfare, E[X] − C (C is the total cost of
producing all the items), which is an upper bound on profit.
[BB99] have already proven this result for the case without costs, and [Arm99] has proven this
result for a cost-based two-part tariff which we show is equivalent to PBDC, so this result in itself
is not new. However, our analysis introduces the use of Cantelli’s stronger, one-sided concentration
inequality in bundling, recovering previous bounds asymptotically and achieving a better bound
when the coefficient of variation of X is large. In the latter case, both of the previous works
recommend a bundle price of C+ ε(E[X]−C), earning negligible profit, whereas our analysis never
recommends a bundle price below C + 13(E[X]− C) and guarantees a non-zero profit.
Furthermore, we recommend PBDC even when the number of items is small—the second type
of theoretical bound we present is problem-independent, unaffected by the number of items or their
variances. We prove that the expected profit of the best PBDC pricing is at least 15.2 of the expected
profit of the optimal mechanism, except in detectable pathological cases, where the best PC pricing
achieves this guarantee. The benchmark in this theorem is the maximum expected profit that could
be achieved from explicitly pricing all subsets of items2. This is a tighter benchmark than expected
welfare, which could be infinite without distributional assumptions.
We use tools from the computer science literature to bound this benchmark, most notably
from [BILW14], who prove in the costless case that the better of PB and PC earns at least 16 of
2Technically, the optimal mechanism is also allowed to offer lotteries of items, which have been shown to be
necessary for achieving the optimum, in [HR12].
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the optimal revenue. We improve their bound from 16 to
1
5.2 by using Cantelli’s inequality, and
enhancing their core-tail decomposition technique in analyzing the core and tail together. We also
construct an example improving the upper bound from 1213 ≈ 11.08 to 3+ln 23+2 ln 2 ≈ 11.19 , where the
previous best-known example is from [HN12]. Finally, we generalize the result of Babaioff et al.
to the case with costs, where PBDC is needed instead of PB. We should point out that when the
benchmark is the optimal mechanism, one cannot simply truncate all valuations from below by
cost, because the optimal mechanism could exploit low valuations to reduce the cannibalization of
higher-profit options. In general, profit is non-monotone, i.e. increasing customer valuations can
decrease the optimal profit, as reported in [HN12].
In addition to the theoretical considerations, we provide a continuation of the numerical exper-
iments from [CLS08], extensively testing the efficacy of PBDC on a finite number of items. We use
the same independent demand distributions with the same parameters as [CLS08]. In their setting
where costs are low and identical across items, PBDC is a special case of BSP. However, it still
attains between 97.5% and 100% of the (nearly optimal) BSP profit. If we allow costs to vary and
be more significant, then PBDC drastically outperforms other simple mechanisms (PC, PB, BSP),
demonstrating its robustness under different scenarios. In fact, the worst case for PBDC is the
aforementioned setting where it attains 97.5% of the profit of the best simple mechanism; contrast
this with 79.9%, 16.8%, 59.5% for PC, PB, BSP, respectively, in their wost-case settings. In ad-
dition to being profit-maximizing, PBDC also achieves excellent global surplus in our simulations.
Finally, we show that PBDC attains between 96.6% and 99.4% of the optimal profit (which prices
all subsets) when n = 3, and scales well as n increases.
The general goal of our work is to dispel the myth that high costs should drive a firm away
from bundling and toward individual sales. PBDC allows the firm to reap the benefits of bundling
while preventing items from being consumed for utility below cost. We should point out that there
do exist costless examples with independent valuations on which PBDC performs poorly relative to
the optimal mechanism (which is why it is necessary to include PC in the statement of the second
theoretical result). Here is a list, along with why PBDC (equivalent to PB) is ill-advised for each
instance:
• Example 15 from [HN12]: there are various different valuations, each of which realizes to an
exorbitant value with a small probability; bundling is ineffective because the probability that
more than one valuation is non-zero is infinitessimal
• Examples 1 and 2 from [Rub16]: there is a need to partition the items, i.e. split them into
groups, and offer each group as a different bundle
• Example 4.2 from Section 4 of our paper: there is a need to price-discriminate, i.e. offer high
individual prices and a discounted bundle price
However, our numerical experiments demonstrate that over “average” instances, PBDC performs
far better than these pathological constructions and the worst-case bound of 15.2 ≈ 19.2% suggest.
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Indeed, once PBDC has eliminated the effect of costs, selling everything under one bundle leaves
very little to be desired.
1.1 Literature Review
Bundling has been the focus of many papers in three different disciplines: economics, computer
science, and operations research/marketing science. In general, the literature can be classified into
three categories: papers that provide insights, papers that suggest approximate algorithms with
attractive worst-case bounds, and papers that develop computationally efficient algorithms. In this
subsection we attempt to highlight the most important contributions to the bundling literature,
independent of discipline.
Two Items. In the economics literature, the earliest recognition of bundling being able to
increase the revenue from selling two items is usually attributed to [Sti63]; other early research
for two products includes [AY76, Sch84, MMW89]. Since then, [VK03, MRT07] have established
conditions for bundling being optimal for two potentially correlated goods.
Simple Mechanisms. For more than two items, there is a great practical interest in finding
simple pricing schemes that are both profitable and easy to explain to the customer; for surveys
on how bundling has affected marketing practice see [ST02, VM09]. However, the only concrete,
general pricing scheme we have found in this literature, other than the classical PC and PB, is the
BSP proposed by [HC05] and [CLS08]. Our scheme, PBDC, attempts to add to this literature by
providing a transparent, easy-to-compute heuristic.
Most of the attempts to prove that simple pricing schemes are indeed capturing most of the
optimal profit have been restricted to special cases (see [MV06, MV07]), or empirical evidence,
as in the case of BSP, where its great experimental success has been unexplained. That’s where
we turn to the computer science literature. There has been more general work on auctions with
multiple buyers, or valuation functions where the valuation for a subset may not be additive over
the items in the set, for which we refer to [RW15, Yao15] and the references therein. We focus on
the case of a single buyer with additive valuations, which is the bundling problem.
In this special case, [HN12] introduce performance guarantees for simple mechanisms, which are
further studied in [HR12, HN13]. One line of work ([LY13, BILW14]) culminated in a proof that
either PB or PC must be within 16 of optimal, for arbitrary independent valuations. By relating
PBDC to PB, and improving upon their techniques, we are able to prove that either PBDC or
PC must be within 15.2 of optimal for the independent case with costs. When all costs are equal,
PBDC is a special case of BSP, so our work provides the first theoretical explanation for some of
the successes in [CLS08].
Recently, mechanisms where items are partitioned before bundling have also been advocated
as simple in [CH13, Rub16]. Our bound improves the theoretical guarantee for the partitioning
scheme in [Rub16] from 16 to
1
5.2 . The same core-tail decomposition of [BILW14] has also been
recently used in [BDHS15, Yao15], so our new bound improves guarantees from those works as
well.
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Computational Solutions. Others have tried to tackle the problem with more items by giving
up on simplicity and computing an explicit optimal or near-optimal solution using optimization
techniques. A mixed integer programming formulation was first seen in [HM90], and recently
in the mechanism design literature, explicit polynomial-time solutions were provided via linear
programming in [CDW12, CH13].
As far as computing the optimal prices for simple mechanisms, [WHCA08] use non-linear mixed
integer programming to solve for the optimal BSP prices, while [Rub16] gives a PTAS for the optimal
partitioning. Computation is another benefit of PBDC—like PB, it only requires calculating one
price, which can be done via convolution.
Large Number of Items. Yet another line of work addresses the complexity of many items by
claiming that PB is guaranteed to be optimal as the number of items approaches infinity, assuming
independence and uniformly bounded variances. Traditionally, this line of work has dealt with
information goods which have no marginal costs (see [BB99, BB00]), or showed that costs have a
substantial effect on the efficacy of PB (see [FN06, IW10]). [Arm99] advocates that the same result
can be achieved with costs by using a cost-based two-part tariff, which we prove is equivalent to
PBDC.
Our research strengthens this line of work by using Cantelli’s one-sided concentration inequality
to get a tighter problem-dependent bound. Furthermore, we advocate for PBDC even on a small
number of items, both with our problem-independent bound, and our numerical experiments.
Closed-form Solutions. There is also interest in finding analytical closed-form solutions for
the optimal pricing under simple cases of the problem. In the case of two independent valuations,
one of which is uniform on [0, b1] and the other which is uniform on [0, b2], [Eck10] derives elementary
equations for the optimal Mixed Bundling prices. [Bha13] shows that the equations involve roots
of high-degree polynomials once costs are introduced, and uses a linear approximation to record
solutions. Our transformation in Section 2 shows that the problem with costs is equivalent to the
problem for distributions uniform on [a1, b1] and [a2, b2], where a1 and a2 could be negative. The
difficulty of analytical solutions in general is discussed in [Wil93, Arm96, PVM10].
1.2 Summary of Contributions and Outline of Paper
• We introduce the idea of PBDC, eliminating the problem costs pose to bundling (Section 2):
– We show that PBDC has equivalent formulations in the cost-based two-part tariff that
exists in the theoretical literature, as well as a new per-item discount scheme
– The idea of PBDC motivates a transformation from costs to negative valuations, enabling
the analysis in subsequent sections
• We improve “large-number-of-items” bounds for the performance of PBDC, using Cantelli’s
inequality (Section 3):
– We recover existing bounds asymptotically and achieve a better bound when the coeffi-
cient of variation is large
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– Our bound suggests that the firm should not price the bundle such that the profit margin
is less than 1/3 of the expected welfare
• We provide finite-item, distribution-free bounds for the performance of PBDC (Section 4):
– We generalize existing bounds to the case with costs, where PBDC is needed instead of
PB
– We improve existing bounds in both directions (upper and lower bound)
– We compare this type of performance guarantee to that in the previous section
• We provide a continuation of the numerical experiments from [CLS08], demonstrating the
efficacy of PBDC for a finite number of items (Section 5)
2 Set-up and Equivalence Propositions
A firm has n different items for sale. For each i, the cost incurred by the firm for selling item i
is ci, a non-negative real number. ci can be thought of as an instantaneous production cost, the
opportunity cost of saving the inventory for someone else, or the value of the item to the seller.
Each of the firm’s customers has a valuation vector x ∈ Rn for the items. A customer wants at
most one of each item, and her utility for a subset of items S is
∑
i∈S xi. x can be thought of as
a random vector drawn from D, the distribution of valuation vectors across the population. The
firm is risk-neutral and its objective is to maximize the expected per-customer profit.
In the full generality of the problem, the firm’s mechanism for selling the items is a menu M
of entries (q, s), where q ∈ [0, 1]n is the allocation indicating the fraction of each item transferred
to the customer, and s is the payment that must be made for this allocation. If q has fractional
entries, then the allocation can be thought of as a lottery where the customer only gets some items
with a certain probability. The customer is also risk-neutral and chooses the entry maximizing her
expected surplus, qTx − s. We will assume that for every entry, the payment covers the expected
cost for the firm to produce that allocation, i.e. s ≥ qT c, where c = (c1, . . . , cn). Simultaneously
removing all entries in the menu with s < qT c cannot decrease the profit, since this can only force a
customer who previously selected an entry with negative profit to select an entry with non-negative
profit.
Let X denote the support of D. Given a menuM, for all x ∈ X , let qM(x) denote the allocation
chosen by a customer with valuation vector x, and sM(x) denote the corresponding payment. We
will omit the subscript M when the context is clear. (qM(x), sM(x)) must maximize the surplus
of the customer among all entries ofM3 (the mechanism is incentive-compatible), and one of these
entries must be the no-purchase option with q = 0, s = 0 (the mechanism is individually rational).
3In the case there are multiple maxima, the firm can choose between them; this can always be achieved by small
perturbations.
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The firm’s profit maximization problem can be written as maxM Ex∼D[sM(x) − qM(x)T c].
However, the optimization over general menus is intractable, and the resulting menu may not be
practical.
Definition 2.1. A pricing scheme is a restricted class of menus, implied by a compact way of
communicating the menu to the customer. It is assumed that the optimization problem over the
restricted class of menus can be solved efficiently.
The following pricing schemes are frequently referenced throughout this paper:
1. Pure Components (PC): items are offered individually, at respective non-negative prices
PPC1 , . . . , P
PC
n .
2. Pure Components with Uniform Discount (PCUD): items are offered individually, at respec-
tive prices PPCUD1 , . . . , P
PCUD
n . There is an absolute discount of P
PCUD
0 which is applied to
each item bought beyond the first. For all i, PPCUDi ≥ PPCUD0 ≥ 0 is imposed.
3. Pure Bundling (PB): all of the items are offered in a single bundle at non-negative price PPB0 ,
and there are no separate sales.
4. Pure Bundling with Disposal (PBD): all of the items are offered in a single bundle at price
PPBD0 , with the agreement that if the customer buys the bundle, she can return any subset
of items S for a refund equal to
∑
i∈S P
PBD
i . For all i, P
PBD
i ≥ 0 is imposed. Furthermore,
PPBD0 ≥
∑n
i=1 P
PBD
i is imposed.
5. Tariff Pricing (TP): there is a membership fee of PTP0 to enter the market. If the cus-
tomer enters the market, she can buy up to one unit of each item i for the price of PTPi .
PTP0 , P
TP
1 , . . . , P
TP
n are all imposed to be non-negative.
6. Bundle-Size Pricing (BSP): the price of a subset S is PBSP|S| , which is dependent only on the
number of items in S, and not which items are in S. 0 = PBSP0 ≤ PBSP1 ≤ . . . ≤ PBSPn is
imposed.
PC and PB were introduced by [AY76]. PCUD and PBD are variations of PC and PB, re-
spectively, and to the best of our knowledge, PCUD and PBD are new to our paper. BSP was
introduced by [HC05, CLS08], while the idea of TP could be seen in [Arm99]. Note that PC
corresponds to the degenerate case of PBD where PPBD0 =
∑n
i=1 P
PBD
i .
Our first observation is the following:
Proposition 2.2. PCUD, PBD, and TP represent the same class of menus. Specifically, given a
PBD representation with prices
(PPBD0 , P
PBD
1 , . . . , P
PBD
n ) (1)
the corresponding PCUD representation is
(PPCUD0 = P
PBD
0 −
n∑
i=1
PPBDi , P
PCUD
1 = P
PBD
1 + P
PCUD
0 , . . . , P
PCUD
n = P
PBD
n + P
PCUD
0 ) (2)
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and the corresponding TP representation is
(PTP0 = P
PBD
0 −
n∑
i=1
PPBDi , P
TP
1 = P
PBD
1 , . . . , P
TP
n = P
PBD
n ). (3)
The proofs of propositions are deferred to Appendix A. Hereinafter, we will always refer to
PBD instead of PCUD and TP for the analysis; however, the existence of PCUD and TP gives the
firm additional flexibility in how to describe these menus to the customer. Specifically, when the
number of items is small, PCUD should be used instead of TP, since it does not sound so enticing
for one to pay a surcharge in order to buy a small number of items. On the other hand, when the
number of items is large, PPCUD0 tends to be large, causing the individual items to be marked at
exorbitant prices should PCUD be used. In this case, paying a membership fee to have access to
all the items does not sound so bad.
We are especially interested in the following subclass of PBD, where PPBDi = ci for all i. Similar
subclasses can also be defined for PCUD and TP, following Proposition 2.2.
Pure Bundling with Disposal for Cost (PBDC): the bundle with all of the items is offered at PPBD0 .
If the customer buys the bundle, she can return any subset S of items for a refund of
∑
i∈S ci.
Setting the refund for each item equal to its cost is a logical restriction to put on PBD. To see
why, consider the following definitions:
Definition 2.3. The welfare generated by a customer with valuations (x1, . . . , xn) is
∑n
i=1 max{xi−
ci, 0}, which is realized when every item valued above cost is transferred and no other items are
transferred. Welfare can be split up as follows:
• The total surplus is the welfare realized from transfers that occurred, equal to∑ni=1 qi(x)(xi−
ci). Total surplus can be further split up depending on the price charged:
– The producer surplus is another term for the profit earned by the firm, equal to s(x)−∑n
i=1 qi(x)ci.
– The consumer surplus is the utility gained by the customer, equal to
∑n
i=1 qi(x)xi−s(x).
• The deadweight loss is the welfare lost because an item valued above cost was not transferred,
equal to
∑
i:xi>ci
(1− qi(x))(xi − ci).
• The overinclusion loss4 is the welfare lost because items were consumed for utility below cost,
equal to
∑
i:xi<ci
qi(x)(ci − xi).
It is clear from the equations that the sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus, deadweight
loss, and overinclusion loss is
∑
i:xi>ci
(xi − ci), equal to welfare. Also, the fact that the consumer
surplus is non-negative (since the customer can always choose the no-purchase option) implies that
the profit is no greater than the total surplus, which in turn is no greater than the welfare.
4We use this terminology because [AY76] refer to the act of not incurring this loss as exclusion.
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PBDC (and thus PBD) is strictly better than PB in the following sense:
Proposition 2.4. Given a PB menu with price PPB which is at least c1+ . . .+cn, consider instead
the PBD menu with prices (PPBD0 = P
PB, PPBD1 = c1, . . . , P
PBD
n = cn). For all x:
• The producer surplus is no less than before.
• The consumer surplus is no less than before.
• The deadweight loss is no more than before.
• The overinclusion loss is no more than before.
Note that the preceding statements are not only in expectation; for every valuation vector x
both the firm and the customer are better off. There is no reason to use PB if PBDC can be used
instead, because PBDC is effectively PB where all valuations xi have been replaced by max{xi, ci}.
This observation leads us to the following lemma:
Proposition 2.5. The firm’s problem of maximizing expected profit with distribution D and costs c
is equivalent to the transformed problem of maximizing expected revenue with distribution D′, where
D′ is the distribution D shifted downward by ci in every dimension i. Furthermore, for any menu
in the original problem, the corresponding menu in the transformed problem has the payment for
each allocation reduced by the cost of producing that allocation.
Proposition 2.5 is stated in precise mathematical language and proven in Appendix A. If the
original optimization problem was over a restricted class of menus, then the class restriction in the
transformed setting can be found via the second statement in Proposition 2.5.
For the remainder of this paper, we focus on bounding the revenue of PBDC in the transformed
setting, which is more amenable to analysis. PBDC becomes the class of menus that offer the same
price P for any non-empty subset of items (see Remark 7.1 in Appendix A for a technical proof of
this). The customer makes a purchase if and only if her non-negative valuations (corresponding to
valuations no less than cost) sum to at least P , in which case the firm earns P .
It may be tempting to truncate all negative customer valuations to 0 and claim that after this
further transformation, PBDC is identical to PB. However, in Section 4, we bound the performance
of the best PBDC menu relative to the optimal menu (with no restriction to a pricing scheme),
which can be designed to exploit negative valuations to reduce the cannibalization of higher-priced
menu entries. In general, revenue is non-monotone, i.e. increasing customer valuations can decrease
the optimal revenue—see [HN12].
3 Asymptotic Performance Bounds
In this section we analyze the performance of PBDC with a large number of items, whose costs have
been transformed into negative valuations according to the previous section. We assume that the
valuations for different items are independent random variables. Also making some assumptions
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on the means and variances of the individual distributions, PBDC is asymptotically optimal as the
number of items becomes large.
[Arm99] has already proven this result for Cost-based Tariff Pricing (TP with the additional
restriction that PTPi = ci for all i), which is equivalent to PBDC via Proposition 2.2. However,
our analysis works under weaker assumptions, by employing Cantelli’s inequality, along with other
tools. To our knowledge, we are the first to use Cantelli’s one-sided concentration inequality to
get an improved performance bound for bundling; previous works by [BB99, Arm99, FN06] all use
the weaker Chebyshev’s inequality. The analysis also motivates our finite-item, distribution-free
bounds in Section 4, where we again make improvements using Cantelli’s inequality.
Lemma 3.1. (Cantelli’s Inequality) Let X be a random variable with (finite) mean µ and variance
σ2. Let t be an arbitrary non-negative real number. Then
P[X − µ ≤ −t] ≤ σ
2
σ2 + t2
We refer the reader to [Lug09] for a proof, as well as more background. Our main result in this
section is the following:
Theorem 3.2. Suppose a firm is selling items to a customer with valuation vector x drawn from
distribution D. Let Val+(D) denote the mean of the welfare, equal to Ex∼D[
∑
i max{xi, 0}], and
assume that 0 < Val+(D) <∞. Furthermore, let Cv+(D) denote the coefficient of variation of the
welfare, equal to
√
Varx∼D[
∑
imax{xi,0}]
Ex∼D[
∑
imax{xi,0}] , and assume that Cv
+(D) <∞. Then for all ε ∈ [0, 1], the
expected revenue of the PBDC menu with price (1− ε)Val+(D) is at least ε2−ε3
ε2+(Cv+(D))2
·Val+(D).
In particular, if
ε =
2(Cv+(D))
2
3
3(Cv+(D))
2
3 + 2
, (4)
then the expected revenue is at least
4
4 + 24(Cv+(D))
2
3 + 45(Cv+(D))
4
3 + 27(Cv+(D))2
·Val+(D) (5)
which in turn is at least
(1− 6(Cv+(D)) 23 ) ·Val+(D). (6)
(6) shows that when the coefficient of variation is close to 0, ε scales with (Cv+(D))
2
3 and
earns a
(
1 − Θ((Cv+(D)) 23 ))−fraction of the expected welfare, recovering the result from [BB99]
and [Arm99]. However, for larger Cv+(D), we still get a non-zero revenue guarantee in (5), and
interestingly our analysis never recommends offering the bundle below the price of (1−23)Val+(D) =
Val+(D)
3 . Contrast this to the previous analyses, which recommend ε = 1 when Cv
+(D) ≥ 1,
earning zero revenue. The value of ε in (4), recommended by our analysis, is useful even when the
firm has the resources to compute the optimal value of ε from D—both as a managerial reference
point, as well as in situations where the firm knows the mean and variance in demand but is
uncertain about the exact distribution.
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Theorem 3.2 treats the welfare as an abstract random variable, but the revenue guarantee is
weak if the coefficient of variation is large. Independence is important in allowing the “law of large
numbers” to control Cv+(D) when the number of items n is large.
Corollary 3.3. Suppose a firm is selling n items to a customer with independent valuations
x1, . . . , xn forming product distribution D. Let µmin be a lower bound on E[max{xi, 0}], and let
σ2max be an upper bound on Var[max{xi, 0}], over i = 1, . . . , n. Suppose µmin > 0, σmax < ∞, and
n > (σmaxµmin )
2. Then the expected revenue of an optimal menu within PBDC is at least
(1− 6(σmax
µmin
)
2
3
1
3
√
n
) ·Val+(D).
Taking n→∞, we get the result that PBDC extracts the entire welfare. Note that truncating
the random variables xi from below by 0 can only increase the mean and decrease the variance,
so any lower bound on E[xi] and upper bound on Var[xi] would also satisfy the conditions in
Corollary 3.3.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let X =
∑n
i=1 max{xi, 0} be a single random variable representing
the welfare of a valuation vector drawn from D. As additional shorthand, let µ = Val+(D) denote
the mean of X, σ = Val+(D) · Cv+(D) denote the standard deviation of X, and C = Cv+(D)
denote the coefficient of variation of X.
We would like to bound the probability that X < (1 − ε)µ from above. Applying Cantelli’s
inequality with t = εµ, this probability is at most σ
2
σ2+ε2µ2
. Therefore, our expected revenue is at
least
(1− ε)µ · (1− σ
2
σ2 + ε2µ2
) = µ · (1− ε)ε
2µ2
σ2 + ε2µ2
.
The fraction of expected welfare earned is
ε2 − ε3
ε2 + C2
≥ ε
2 − ε3
2
3y
3C−
2
3 + 13C
4
3 + C2
(7)
≥ ε
2 − (1 + 23C−
2
3 )ε3
1
3C
4
3 + C2
. (8)
The first inequality uses the weighted arithmetic mean–geometric mean inequality (see [Zha08] for a
reference), which yields 2y
3+C2
3 ≥ (y6C2)
1
3 = y2C
2
3 . The second inequality is because for a fraction
a
b with 0 < a ≤ b, subtracting the same amount less than b from both the numerator and the
denominator can only decrease the fraction.
Now, if we choose ε =
2C
2
3
3C
2
3 + 2
(this is motivated by setting the derivative of (8) to zero), then
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the LHS of (7) becomes
4C
4
3 (1− 23)
(3C
2
3 + 2)2(13C
4
3 + C2)
=
4
3
(2 + 3C
2
3 )2(13 + C
2
3 )
=
4
4 + 24C
2
3 + 45C
4
3 + 27C2
= 1− 6C 23
(
4 + 152 C
2
3 + 92C
4
3
4 + 24C
2
3 + 45C
4
3 + 27C2
)
≥ 1− 6C 23
where the inequality holds because the expression in parentheses is less than 1. This establishes
both (5) and (6), completing the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Proof. Proof of Corollary 3.3. By independence, Var[
∑n
i=1 max{xi, 0}] =
∑n
i=1 Var[max{xi, 0}]
which is at most nσ2max. Furthermore, E[
∑n
i=1 max{xi, 0}] ≥ nµmin. Therefore, Cv+(D) is upper
bounded by σmax
µmin
√
n
, and it is easy to see from the proof of Theorem 3.2 that all of its statements
continue to hold when Cv+(D) is replaced by an upper bound on Cv+(D). The condition n >
(σmaxµmin )
2 ensures that Cv+(D) < 1, and the result follows immediately from substituting Cv+(D) ≤
σmax
µmin
√
n
into (6).
4 Finite-item, Distribution-free Performance Bounds
In this section we analyze the performance of PBDC with only the independence assumption on
the items, whose costs have been transformed into negative valuations according to Section 2. All
proofs are deferred to Appendices B–C, but we sketch the techniques needed to handle arbitrary
distributions.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose a firm is selling items to a customer with independent (and potentially
negative) valuations forming product distribution D. Let Rev(D) denote the expected revenue of
an optimal menu (along with tie-breaking rules) for distribution D. Then the expected revenue of
either the optimal menu within PBDC or the optimal menu within PC is at least
1
5.2
·Rev(D).
In the previous section, we showed that with assumptions on the number of items and their
variances, PBDC can earn almost all of the expected welfare, Val+(D). However, this is clearly
false without distributional assumptions—Val+(D) can be infinite. To recover some guarantee on
performance, we need to use the core-tail decomposition, a technique developed through [HN12,
LY13, BILW14].
The idea of the core-tail decomposition is to split off from each independent distribution all
the valuations above a large positive cutoff (the “tail”). The remaining valuations (the “core”)
are bounded, and it can be shown using a concentration inequality that PB (in our case PBDC)
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Table 1: Comparison of Guarantees
Corollary 3.3 (Section 3) Theorem 4.1 (Section 4)
Dependence on n bound only relevant for large n none
Assumptions on Distributions uniformly bounded variance none
Benchmark expected welfare expected revenue of optimal menu
Fraction of Benchmark Guaranteed 100% as n→∞ 15.2 , with the help of PC
Related Literature
[BB99]
[BILW14]
[Arm99]
*The advantages of each bound are bolded.
performs well relative to the welfare of the core. Meanwhile, PC can be shown to perform well
relative to the optimal mechanism in the tail. Finally, the core bound (relative to the expected
welfare of the core) and the tail bound (relative to the optimal expected revenue for the tail) can
be combined to get a performance guarantee relative to the optimal expected revenue on D.
Theorem 4.1 improves upon the main result of [BILW14] by increasing the guarantee from 16
to 15.2 , and allowing for negative valuations. The differences in our analysis can be summarized as
follows:
• We analyze the core and tail together, and show that the worst case for PBDC in the core
and worst case for PC in the tail cannot simultaneously occur
• We use Cantelli’s inequality instead of Chebyshev’s inequality in the core bound
• We show that the core bound and the tail bound can still be combined to upper-bound the
optimal revenue on D when the optimal mechanism can exploit negative valuations
Table 1 compares Theorem 4.1 to the type of bound in the previous section, in particular
Corollary 3.3. Essentially, to accommodate arbitrary distributions, we have to settle for a constant
fraction of the optimum, compare against an optimum that is convoluted, and also allow ourselves
to use PC in pathological cases.
One additional point worth mentioning is that it is unclear from Theorem 4.1 what the optimal
prices for PBDC or PC are. It is assumed that the firm, knowing distribution D, can compute the
optimal prices for both PBDC and PC and use the scheme with higher expected revenue, with the
knowledge that it will be within 15.2 of optimal. Meanwhile, Theorem 3.2, with its simpler analysis,
has an explicit benchmark price of (Cv
+(D))2/3+2
3(Cv+(D))2/3+2
·Val+(D) for the bundle in PBDC.
Finally, we address the tightness of Theorem 4.1. First we present a theoretical upper bound.
Example 4.2. Consider an instance with 2 costless items, which have IID valuations distributed as
follows. There is a point mass of size 1− ρ at 0, a point mass of size ρ2 at 2, and the remaining ρ2
mass distributed in an equal-revenue fashion on [1, 2), i.e. selling individually at any price in [1, 2)
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results in the same revenue. Formally, if Y is a random variable with this distribution, then
P[Y ≥ y] =

1 y = 0
ρ 0 < y ≤ 1
ρ
y 1 ≤ y ≤ 2
where the value of ρ is optimized to be 33+ln 2 ≈ 0.81.
Theorem 4.3. Consider the instance in Example 4.2. The best possible PC revenue is 2ρ, attained
by selling individual items at any price in [1, 2]. The best possible PB revenue is also 2ρ, attained
by selling the bundle at the price of 2 or 3. The optimal revenue is at least 2ρ(2 − ρ); this value
can be achieved by selling individual items at the price of 2, and the bundle at the discounted price
of 3.
Therefore, neither PC nor PB can obtain more than 3+ln 23+2 ln 2 ·Rev(D) which is approximately
1
1.19
·Rev(D).
In Example 4.2, both PC and PB perform poorly because there is a need to price-discriminate,
i.e. allow customers who highly value an item to buy it for its individual price, but still give
customers with lower valuations a chance of buying it as part of a discounted bundle. Very recently,
[Rub16] constructed an example where both PC and PB perform poorly because there is a need
to partition the items, i.e. split them into groups, and offer each group as a different bundle. In
his example, the better of PC and PB can only obtain 12 + ε of the revenue via partitioning, which
is smaller than our bound. However, our example exhibits the worst-known loss from not price-
discriminating, where even partitioning performs poorly relative to the optimal mechanism. Our
example also only requires two IID items, following the examples of [HN12, HR12]; the example in
[Rub16] requires a large number of distinct items.
Nonetheless, there is a large gap between the best-known lower bound from Theorem 4.1 and
the best-known upper bounds, and furthermore, being guaranteed only 15.2 ≈ 19.2% of the optimal
profit does not sound so enticing. However, this bound arises from a worst-case analysis that needs
to address pathological instances, on which PBDC does not obtain 15.2 of the optimum, but PC
does. In the next section, we test the performance of PBDC over “average” instances.
5 Numerical Experiments
In this section we conduct a continuation of the numerical experiments from [CLS08] where PBDC
is included as an additional pricing scheme. As a disclaimer, we should quote [CLS08] on the
limitations inherent to this kind of numerical analysis:
“Although we attempt to cover a large space of parameter values, the results clearly
depend on the specific parameters we choose (i.e., the choice of grid). Further, there
is no way for us to know whether we are under- or oversampling the relevant (i.e.,
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Table 2: Ranges of Parameters, replicated from [CLS08]
Exponential Marginal distributions are Exponential, with means chosen uniformly from [0.2, 2].
Thus the rates λ are in [0.5, 5].
Logit Marginal distributions are Gumbel, with fixed scale σ = 0.25 and means chosen uni-
formly from [0, 2.5]. Thus the locations µ are in [−0.25γ, 2.5−0.25γ] ≈ [−0.14, 2.36].
Lognormal Marginal distributions are Lognormal. Logarithms of valuations are Normally dis-
tributed with means chosen uniformly from [−1.5, 1] and fixed variance σ2 = 0.25.
Thus the original valuations have means in [e−1.5+0.125, e1+0.125] ≈ [0.25, 3.08].
Normal Marginal distributions are Normal with means chosen uniformly from [−1, 2.5] and
variances chosen uniformly from [0.25, 1.75].
Uniform Marginal distributions are Uniform on [0, b], where b is chosen uniformly from [0.4, 4].
Thus the means are in [0.2, 2].
*Note that [CLS08] have two separate families of Normal distributions, one with varying mean
and one with varying variance. For convenience, we allow both to vary at the same time.
empirically plausible) combinations of parameters. So, for example, when we describe
average outcomes, these should certainly not be interpreted as outcomes that would be
expected in an empirical sensethey should be interpreted narrowly as the average of the
experiments we performed.”
5.1 Procedure
For consistency, we follow the setup from [CLS08] as closely as possible. We use the same five fam-
ilies of valuation distributions commonly used to model demand—Exponential, Logit, Lognormal,
Normal, and Uniform. We also use the same ranges of parameters for these families, as outlined
in Table 2. The parameters were calibrated so that valuations across different families have similar
means on average, and the highest means are around 10 times the lowest means. We allow for free
disposal, just like [CLS08]—all negative valuations are converted to 0. We assume that valuations
are independent across items.
As far as costs, we consider three scenarios:
1. Heterogeneous Items: valuation distributions fluctuate in accordance with Table 2, while costs
are low. The cost of each item is set to 0.2, except in the case of Uniform distributions, where
it is set to half the item’s mean valuation. These are the same numbers used in [CLS08], so
this scenario is a duplicate of some of their experiments.
2. Heterogeneous Costs: valuation distributions are identical, while costs fluctuate. The costs
are chosen uniformly from [0, 2.5], approximately the same range as the means. In the case
of the bounded Uniform distribution, the costs are chosen uniformly from 0 to 0.75 times the
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Table 3: Summary of Parameters and Costs
Taste Distribution Range for Means Fixed Mean Range for Costs Fixed Cost
Exponential [0.20,2.00] 1.25 [0,2.5] 0.2
Logit [0.00,2.50] 1.5 [0,2.5] 0.2
Lognormal [0.25,3.08] e0.5+0.125 ≈ 1.87 [0,2.5] 0.2
Normal [0.00,2.50] 1.5 (and fixed variance 1) [0,2.5] 0.2
Uniform [0.20,2.00] irrelevant [0, 1.5]×mean 0.5×mean
maximum valuation, so that there always are some customers who value the item above cost.
The fixed valuation distributions are disclosed in Table 3—we choose a mean that is on the
high end of the range to avoid degenerate instances, where the welfare in the system is near
0 when costs are high.
3. Heterogeneous Items and Costs: both valuation distributions and costs are allowed to fluctu-
ate (independently) according to the preceding scenarios.
The parameters and costs are summarized in Table 3.
We compare the four simple pricing schemes—PC, PB, BSP, and PBDC. Unlike [CLS08], we
do not compute the optimal deterministic profit with 2n − 1 prices, since it is hard to compute,
difficult to implement in practice, and could be far off from the optimal profit of a randomized
mechanism anyway. Skipping this expensive computation allows us to consider n from 2 up to 6.
For each combination of the 3 cost scenarios, 5 demand distributions, and 5 options for n, we
randomly generate 200 instances, resulting in 15000 total instances. [CLS08] were able to discretize
the parameter space for each combination and generate 220 instances in a grid. While generating
instances in a grid is more reliable than generating instances randomly, we simply have too many
combinations, because we allow costs to vary independently, allow for larger n, and in the case of
Normal distributions, also allow variances to vary independently. Our randomized approach has
the advantage of being scalable, and not depending on the exact grid chosen. Furthermore, we have
verified that 200 instances per combination is enough, in that repeating the experiments does not
cause the reported observations to change by any significance.
5.2 Observations
First, we report the performance of the simple pricing schemes separated by scenario. For each
instance (out of the 15000), we compute which of PC, PB, BSP, PBDC earns the most profit on
that instance, and record the performance of every pricing scheme as a fraction of this optimum.
For each scenario (out of the 3), we report the median performance as well as 10’th percentile
performance of every pricing scheme across the 1000 instances of each distribution family (200 for
each of n = 2, . . . , 6), in Table 4. We also count the number of instances on which each pricing
scheme was best, in Table 5.
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Table 4: Median and 10’th Percentile Performances of Pricing Schemes
Heterogeneous Items Heterogeneous Costs Both Heterogeneous
PC PB BSP PBDC PC PB BSP PBDC PC PB BSP PBDC
Exponential
0.1 %ile .766 .940 1 .994 .850 .269 .807 .995 .884 .137 .759 .978
0.5 %ile .835 .972 1 .999 .931 .489 .907 1 .964 .403 .926 1
Logit
0.1 %ile .826 .937 1 .988 .815 .063 .245 .996 .852 .001 .385 .987
0.5 %ile .873 .992 1 .998 .891 .481 .595 1 .938 .168 .894 1
Lognormal
0.1 %ile .734 .982 1 .998 .775 .513 .760 1 .852 .015 .327 .931
0.5 %ile .799 .996 1 1 .861 .730 .880 1 .970 .245 .887 1
Normal
0.1 %ile .825 .745 1 .957 .858 .297 .779 .982 .904 .010 .699 .974
0.5 %ile .890 .880 1 .975 .926 .547 .912 1 .978 .198 .933 1
Uniform
0.1 %ile .904 .834 .940 .949 .872 .348 .875 .948 .914 .380 .605 .937
0.5 %ile .959 .867 .975 .998 .933 .578 .974 1 .982 .638 .875 1
*For each scenario, the best performance in each row is bolded. The overall worst median
performance of each pricing scheme is italicized.
We know from [CLS08] that BSP is within 1% of the deterministic optimum in most of their
settings, so there is minimal room for improvement under scenario 1. In fact, PBDC is a special
case of BSP when all costs are identical, and very similar to PB when costs are low. However, as
one can see in Table 4, PBDC still extracts close to 100% of the BSP profit under this scenario,
hence it also extracts close to 100% of the deterministic optimum. For Uniform valuations, PBDC
is no longer a special case of BSP, since costs vary proportionally with means. PBDC actually
outperforms BSP in this setting—indeed, this is by far the worst setting for BSP listed in [CLS08,
tbl. 5], where it only extracts 91% of the deterministic optimum.
Scenario 2, where valuation distributions are identical but costs are allowed to fluctuate, really
exhibits the power of PBDC, which allows customers to consume only the items they value above
cost via self-selection. PC loses out on not bundling similar items that differ only in cost, while BSP
is forced to compromise between charging cheap prices where high-cost items may be consumed
for utility below cost, or charging expensive prices that result in a lot of deadweight loss in the
low-cost items. In Appendix D, we show an instance that exemplifies why BSP performs so poorly
when the costs in the setup from [CLS08] are increased.
When both valuation distributions and costs are allowed to vary under scenario 3, PBDC is still
the best strategy by a significant margin. However, the benefits of bundling have decreased when
items can be drastically different, so PC has gained ground. It seems intuitive to hypothesize that
the performance of PC is inflated by the small values of n we are using. In the next subsection,
we organize our reports separated by n, under scenario 3 (where both valuation distributions and
costs are allowed to fluctuate).
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Table 5: Number of Instances on which each Pricing Scheme was Best
Heterogeneous Items Heterogeneous Costs Both Heterogeneous
PC PB BSP PBDC PC PB BSP PBDC PC PB BSP PBDC
Exponential 5 - 995 - 19 - 114 867 206 - 113 681
Logit 0 - 1000 - 121 - 45 834 179 - 133 688
Lognormal 0 - 1000 - 8 - 70 922 245 - 68 687
Normal 12 - 988 - 20 - 180 800 216 - 201 583
Uniform 228 - 293 479 145 - 348 507 370 - 129 501
Figure 1: Breakdown of Welfare for each Pricing Scheme, averaged over n
5.3 Separation by n and Effects on Welfare
In this subsection, we allow both valuation distributions and costs to vary, and report averages
across demand distributions, separated by n (instead of medians over the different choices for
n, separated by demand distribution). Since the distribution families we’re amalgamating were
calibrated to have similar means over their ranges of parameters, it makes sense in this subsection
to report average absolute profits, instead of median fractions. We also report the figures defined
in Definition 2.3, in the same way as [CLS08].
In Table 6, we report the expected values of these figures across the 1000 instances for each n.
The main conclusions are best summarized in Figures 1-2.
The first graph (Figure 1) shows that although PBDC optimizes from the perspective of a
selfish monopolist interested only in Producer Surplus, it has a similar advantage in Total Surplus.
There is no Overinclusion Loss, and the monopolist is encouraged to choose a low tariff price so
that most customers can enter the market. PC also incurs no Overinclusion Loss, but incurs more
Deadweight Loss because it does not bundle. PB incurs significantly more Overinclusion Loss than
any other strategy, forcing the customer into buying every item at once. All in all, PBDC is equally
attractive from the standpoint of an altruistic policymaker interested in maximizing Total Surplus.
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Table 6: Report of Economics Figures, separated by n
Number of Items Statistic PC PB BSP PBDC
Producer Surplus 0.427 0.301 0.412 0.432
Consumer Surplus 0.287 0.194 0.250 0.292
2 Total Surplus 0.714 0.495 0.662 0.724
Deadweight Loss 0.192 0.351 0.224 0.183
Overinclusion Loss - 0.061 0.021 -
Producer Surplus 0.655 0.395 0.630 0.683
Consumer Surplus 0.437 0.254 0.382 0.436
3 Total Surplus 1.092 0.649 1.011 1.119
Deadweight Loss 0.291 0.604 0.352 0.264
Overinclusion Loss - 0.130 0.020 -
Producer Surplus 0.870 0.457 0.827 0.929
Consumer Surplus 0.587 0.293 0.497 0.582
4 Total Surplus 1.456 0.749 1.324 1.511
Deadweight Loss 0.396 0.905 0.498 0.342
Overinclusion Loss - 0.198 0.031 -
Producer Surplus 1.070 0.504 1.030 1.167
Consumer Surplus 0.705 0.297 0.595 0.703
5 Total Surplus 1.775 0.802 1.625 1.870
Deadweight Loss 0.488 1.158 0.600 0.394
Overinclusion Loss - 0.304 0.039 -
Producer Surplus 1.265 0.553 1.206 1.409
Consumer Surplus 0.844 0.346 0.697 0.828
6 Total Surplus 2.108 0.899 1.902 2.237
Deadweight Loss 0.587 1.440 0.736 0.459
Overinclusion Loss - 0.356 0.057 -
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Figure 2: Average Profit of each Pricing Scheme, as a function of n
The second graph (Figure 2) shows the profits of each pricing scheme as n increases. The PC
profits increase linearly with n, since items are sold separately. Both the PB and the BSP profits
are concave in n—that is, the marginal gain from having one more item to sell is decreasing. Indeed,
PB is burdened with adding to its grand bundle another item that could be valued below cost, while
BSP is burdened with an additional distinct item to consider in its item-symmetric cost structure.
PBDC is the only pricing scheme where the profit is convex in n, as each item creates additional
incentive for the customer to enter the market, and makes their total utility from entering the
market more concentrated. This confirms the hypothesis that while Table 4 reports a small gap
between PC and PBDC under scenario 3, this gap quickly widens as n increases.
5.4 Grid Instances and Comparing with the Deterministic Optimum for n = 3
In this subsection, we generate instances in a grid where both valuation distributions and costs are
allowed to vary, for the n = 3 case. There are 3 possibilities for distribution mean and 3 possibilities
for cost for each of 3 different items, resulting in a total of 36 = 729 instances. This is repeated
over the 5 different demand distributions. The grid is outlined in Table 7; we centered the grid
around the values from Table 3.
We report the performance of each simple pricing scheme over these 729 instances in the same
manner as Table 4, except this time every number is recorded as a fraction of the optimal deter-
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Table 7: Grid for Items Parameters and Costs
Taste Distribution Grid for Means Grid for Costs
Exponential {0.5, 1.25, 2} {0, 1.25, 2.5}
Logit {0.5, 1.5, 2.5} {0, 1.25, 2.5}
Lognormal {e0.125, e0.625, e1.125} ≈ {1.13, 1.87, 3.08} {0, 1.25, 2.5}
Normal {0.5, 1.5, 2.5} (and fixed variance 1) {0, 1.25, 2.5}
Uniform {0.4, 1, 1.6} {0, 0.75, 1.5}×mean
Table 8: Median and 10’th Percentile Performances over the Grid
Taste Distribution Statistic PC PB BSP PBDC
Exponential
0.1 %ile .863 .159 .600 .889
0.5 %ile .932 .474 .872 .966
Logit
0.1 %ile .881 .000 .219 .966
0.5 %ile .941 .308 .918 .994
Lognormal
0.1 %ile .834 .575 .735 .946
0.5 %ile .909 .898 .959 .989
Normal
0.1 %ile .877 .095 .593 .944
0.5 %ile .925 .479 .880 .968
Uniform
0.1 %ile .874 .340 .461 .899
0.5 %ile .922 .723 .888 .972
ministic profit, which is at least the profit of any simple pricing scheme. The results are displayed
in Table 8.
In the median case, PBDC obtains between 96.6% to 99.4% of the deterministic optimum across
the different demand distributions. This confirms both that PBDC is performing well relative to
the optimal deterministic profit and not just other simple mechanisms, and that our earlier numbers
with random instances are consistent.
To summarize our numerical experiments, we considered both scenarios with low costs and
scenarios with high costs, and reported median performances over n = 2, . . . , 6 for different demand
distributions. When costs are low, PC can earn as little as 79.9% of the profit of the optimal simple
mechanism. When costs are high, PB can earn as little as 16.8% of the profit of the optimal simple
mechanism, BSP can earn as little as 59.5%, and PC also falls behind as n increases. PBDC has
the highest percentages overall, and is by far the most robust over different cost scenarios, always
obtaining at least 97.5% of the profit of the optimal simple mechanism. We should point out that
throughout our simulations, PBDC was also computationally much faster than BSP, requiring an
optimization over 1 price instead of n.
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6 Conclusion and Open Questions
In this paper, we propose a simple strategy for the multi-product pricing problem: Pure Bundling
with Disposal for Cost, or PBDC. We prove that PBDC is asymptotically optimal. When there are
only a small number of items, we still guarantee that either PBDC or PC earns at least 15.2 ≈ 19.2%
of the optimal profit, and our simulations suggest that this is closer to 96.6%-99.4% in the average
case, and that PC is not needed. While this is worse than the 99% achieved by [CLS08] for BSP
in their experiments with lower costs, the pricing problem becomes much harder when costs are
significant, and the existing simple pricing schemes (including BSP) fall behind PBDC by a great
deal. Yet, production costs exceeding mean valuations is a common occurrence in industry, where
only a small fraction of a company’s customers may have interest in any particular item.
One caveat with PBDC is that the prices do reveal production costs to the customer. If this
is undesired, a potential remedy is optimizing prices over the larger class of Tariff Pricing (TP)
strategies, which has n + 1 degrees of freedom and is guaranteed to be at least as profitable as
PBDC. We believe that using TP instead of PBDC is very reasonable in practice, so long as the
firm can accept the significant increase in computation time and decrease in the manager’s ability
to interpret the pricing.
However, the true demand distribution is never known, and must be constructed from data.
When the given demand is prone to error, we hypothesize that there is additional benefit in choosing
strategies that optimize one price at a time (such as PC, PB, PBDC) over strategies that optimize
Θ(n) prices together (such as BSP, TP, MB). Besides, the theoretical guarantee for PBDC is no
worse than that for TP, and PBDC is optimal as the number of items approaches infinity. We find
it particularly interesting that as n increases and there are more potential prices to optimize, the
benefit of optimizing only one price is greater.
All in all, PBDC captures the concentration effects of bundling and the selection effects of
individual sales in a single heuristic that is computationally minimal and highly marketable. We
hope our work on PBDC will have an impact on both the theory and practice of bundling, and be
viewed as an effort to tie together the streams of research from three different disciplines: economics,
computer science, and operations research.
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7 Appendix A: Proofs from Section 2
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.2. By the definition of PBD, the customer can purchase any non-
empty subset S of items for the price of PPBD0 −
∑
i/∈S P
PBD
i . Of course, the customer can also
choose not to make a purchase. Altogether, the class of menus represented by PBD is{
{(1S , P PBD0 −
∑
i/∈S
P PBDi ) : S 6= ∅} ∪ {(0, 0)} : P PBD1 ≥ 0, . . . , P PBDn ≥ 0, P PBD0 ≥ P PBD1 + . . .+ P PBDn
}
(9)
where 1S ∈ {0, 1}n is the indicator vector for items belonging to S.
Now, note that (2) defines a valid menu within PCUD since for all i, PPCUDi = P
PBD
i +P
PCUD
0 ≥
PPCUD0 = P
PBD
0 −
∑n
j=1 P
PBD
j ≥ 0. The class of menus represented by (2) is{
{(1S ,
∑
i∈S
P PCUDi − (|S| − 1)P PCUD0 ) : S 6= ∅} ∪ {(0, 0)} : P PBD1 ≥ 0, . . . , P PBDn ≥ 0, P PBD0 ≥ P PBD1 + . . .+ P PBDn
}
=
{
{(1S ,
∑
i∈S
P PBDi + (P
PBD
0 −
n∑
i=1
P PBDi )) : S 6= ∅} ∪ {(0, 0)} : P PBD1 ≥ 0, . . . , P PBDn ≥ 0, P PBD0 ≥ P PBD1 + . . .+ P PBDn
}
=
{
{(1S , P PBD0 −
∑
i/∈S
P PBDi ) : S 6= ∅} ∪ {(0, 0)} : P PBD1 ≥ 0, . . . , P PBDn ≥ 0, P PBD0 ≥ P PBD1 + . . .+ P PBDn
}
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which is identical to (9). Furthermore, it is easy to see that the relation defined by (2) is a bijection
between (9) and{
{(1S ,
∑
i∈S
PPCUDi − (|S| − 1)PPCUD0 ) : S 6= ∅} ∪ {(0, 0)} : PPCUDi ≥ PPCUD0 ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n]
}
.
Similarly, note that (3) defines a valid menu within TP since PTP0 = P
PBD
0 −
∑n
i=1 P
PBD
i ≥ 0,
and for all i, PTPi = P
PBD
i ≥ 0. The class of menus represented by (3) is{
{(1S , PTP0 +
∑
i∈S
PTPi ) : S 6= ∅} ∪ {(0, 0)} : P PBD1 ≥ 0, . . . , P PBDn ≥ 0, P PBD0 ≥ P PBD1 + . . .+ P PBDn
}
=
{
{(1S , (P PBD0 −
n∑
i=1
P PBDi ) +
∑
i∈S
P PBDi ) : S 6= ∅} ∪ {(0, 0)} : P PBD1 ≥ 0, . . . , P PBDn ≥ 0, P PBD0 ≥ P PBD1 + . . .+ P PBDn
}
=
{
{(1S , P PBD0 −
∑
i/∈S
P PBDi ) : S 6= ∅} ∪ {(0, 0)} : P PBD1 ≥ 0, . . . , P PBDn ≥ 0, P PBD0 ≥ P PBD1 + . . .+ P PBDn
}
which is identical to (9). Furthermore, it is easy to see that the relation defined by (3) is a bijection
between (9) and{
{(1S , PTP0 +
∑
i∈S
PTPi ) : S 6= ∅} ∪ {(0, 0)} : PTP0 ≥ 0, PTP1 ≥ 0, . . . , PTPn ≥ 0
}
.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.2.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.4. Consider any valuation vector x ∈ Rn. First suppose the customer
bought the bundle with all the items for PPB. Under the PBD menu, the customer will still buy
the bundle, since it is non-negative utility even if she keeps all the items. However, she will choose
to return any items i with xi < ci. Let S denote the set of such items, which is possibly empty.
• The producer surplus under PB is PPB − ∑ni=1 ci. The producer surplus under PBD is
(PPB −∑i∈S ci)−∑i/∈S ci, which is identical.
• The consumer surplus under PB is ∑ni=1 xi − PPB. The consumer surplus under PBD is∑
i/∈S xi − (PPB −
∑
i∈S ci) =
∑n
i=1 max{xi, ci} − PPB which can only be greater than the
consumer surplus under PB.
• The deadweight loss is 0 in both cases: under PB every item is transferred, whereas under
PBD every item valued above cost is still transferred.
• The overinclusion loss under PB is ∑i∈S(ci − xi) ≥ 0. The overinclusion loss under PBD is
0, since items in S are not transferred.
On the other hand, suppose the customer did not buy the bundle with all the items for PPB.
• The producer surplus under PB is 0. The producer surplus under PBD is either 0 or PPB −∑n
i=1 ci (if the return option allowed the customer to enter the market), which is non-negative.
• The consumer surplus under PB is 0. The consumer surplus under PBD cannot be negative,
since the customer is rational and the no-purchase option is always available.
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• The deadweight loss under PB is ∑i:xi>ci(xi−ci), which is the maximum possible. Therefore,
the deadweight loss under PBD cannot be greater.
• The overinclusion loss under PB is 0. The overinclusion loss under PBD is always 0 when
PPBDi = ci for all i, since items valued below cost are never transferred.
In both cases, we have proven that the statements in Proposition 2.4 hold.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.5. The firm’s problem is to find a menu along with tie-breaking rules
which maximize profit. Note that this is equivalent to finding functions q, s defined on X which are
incentive-compatible, individually rational, and profit-maximizing. Formally, the firm’s problem is
max Ex∼D[s(x)− q(x)T c]
s.t. q(x)Tx− s(x) ≥ q(y)Tx− s(y) ∀x, y ∈ X
q(x)Tx− s(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X
which can be rewritten as
max Ex∼D[s(x)− q(x)T c]
s.t. q(x)T (x− c)− (s(x)− q(x)T c) ≥ q(y)T (x− c)− (s(y)− q(y)T c) ∀x, y ∈ X
q(x)T (x− c)− (s(x)− q(x)T c) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X
Now, define x′ := x − c, y′ := y − c, q′(x) := q(x + c), and s′(x) := s(x + c) − q(x + c)T c. Let
X ′ := {x − c : x ∈ X}, and similarly let D′ be the distribution D shifted ci units downward in
dimension i for every i ∈ [n]. We can see that the above is equivalent to
max Ex′∼D′ [s′(x′)]
s.t. q′(x′)Tx′ − s′(x′) ≥ q′(y′)Tx′ − s′(y′) ∀x′, y′ ∈ X ′
q′(x′)Tx′ − s′(x′) ≥ 0 ∀x′ ∈ X ′
which is identical to the original problem without costs on this new distribution D′.
Now suppose there was a restriction on the menu M = {(q(1), s(1)), (q(2), s(2)), . . .} to belong
to some class M in the original problem. The menu after the transformation, M′, looks like
{(q(1), s(1) − (q(1))T c), (q(2), s(2) − (q(2))T c), . . .}. Therefore, M′ is restricted to the class
M ′ := {{(q(1), s(1) − (q(1))T c), (q(2), s(2) − (q(2))T c), . . .} : {(q(1), s(1)), (q(2), s(2)), . . .} ∈M }.
By assumption that s− qT c ≥ 0 for all menu entries, the payments in M′ are non-negative.
Throughout this paper, it will be clear whether we are in the context of the original problem
or the transformed problem, and we will omit the superscripts used in the preceding proof.
Remark 7.1. As a concrete example of this transformation, consider the pricing scheme PBDC.M
is restricted to be of the form {(1S , PPBD0 − 1T[n]\Sc) : ∅ 6= S ⊆ [n]} ∪ {(0, 0)} where 1S ∈ {0, 1}n is
the indicator vector for items belonging to S. Hence M′ is restricted to be of the form
{(1S , PPBD0 −1T[n]\Sc−1TS c) : ∅ 6= S ⊆ [n]}∪{(0, 0)} = {(1S , PPBD0 −1T[n]c) : ∅ 6= S ⊆ [n]}∪{(0, 0)}.
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Put in words, M′ must belong to the class of menus that offer the same price for any non-empty
subset of items. The fact that the customer can choose to take a subset of items instead of taking all
the items is important, because valuations x′i can be negative (x
′
i is equal to the original valuation
xi subtract the cost ci).
8 Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 4.1
We will WOLOG normalize the valuations so that the optimal PC revenue is 1 (we can do this so
long as the original optimal revenue was positive; if it was 0 then the statement of the theorem is
trivial).
8.1 The Core-Tail Decomposition
We use the core-tail decomposition of [BILW14], with the original idea coming from [LY13]. We
will cut up the domain of the joint distribution and consider the conditional distributions on the
smaller subdomains. Below, we introduce the notation for working with these distributions on
smaller subdomains. One should get comfortable with the idea that some of the distributions
defined could be the null distribution, if they were distributions conditioned on a set of measure 0,
or a product over an empty set of distributions. The product of a null distribution with any other
distribution is still a null distribution.
Definition 8.1. We make the following definitions for this appendix.
• For all i ∈ [n], let ri denote the optimal revenue earned by selling item i individually (by our
normalization,
∑n
i=1 ri = 1).
• Let DCi (the “core” of Di) denote the conditional distribution of Di when it lies in the range
(−∞, 1].
• Let DTi (the “tail” of Di) denote the conditional distribution of Di when it lies in the range
(1,∞).
• Let pi := Pxi∼Di [xi > 1], the probability item i lies in its tail.
• Let A ⊆ [n] represent a subset of items, usually the items whose valuations lie in their tails.
• Let DTA := ×i∈ADTi , the product distribution of only items in their tails.
• Let DCA := ×i/∈ADCi , the product distribution of only items in their cores.
• Let DA := DCA ×DTA, the conditional distribution of D when exactly the subset A of items lie
in their tails. Let pA be the probability this occurs, which is equal to (
∏
i/∈A(1−pi))(
∏
i∈A pi),
by independence.
• Let x+i := max{xi, 0}.
30
• For any valuation distribution S, let Val+(S) := ∑i Ex∼S [x+i ], which is the expected welfare
after the transformation from costs to negative valuations. Note that the sum is only over
the admissible i if S is a distribution on a smaller subdomain.
• Let Rev(S) denote the optimal revenue obtainable from valuation distribution S via any
Incentive Compatible and Individually Rational mechanism, which could include lotteries.
• Let SRev(S) denote the optimal revenue of any pricing scheme falling under the class of
separate sales (Pure Components).
• Let BdcRev(S) denote the optimal revenue of any pricing scheme falling under the class of
PBDC.
(It is understood that Val+,Rev,SRev,BdcRev are 0 when evaluated on the null distribution.)
8.2 Lemmas for Negative Valuations
We need to modify the statements of lemmas from [HN12], [LY13], and [BILW14] to handle negative
valuations. While their proofs can be extended to negative valuations in a straight-forward manner,
we provide full self-contained proofs here for ease of exposition.
Lemma 8.2. (Marginal Mechanism) Let S, S′ be (potentially negative) valuation distributions over
disjoint sets of items. Then
Rev(S × S′) ≤ Val+(S) +Rev(S′)
The Marginal Mechanism tells us that when selling a group of independent items, we cannot
do better than breaking off some items individually, extracting the entire welfare from those items,
and selling the remaining items as a group.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 8.2. Consider the following mechanism for selling to a buyer with valuations
drawn from S′. First, sample a value v ∼ S, and reveal to the buyer these make-believe valuations
for the items in S. Then run a mechanism obtaining Rev(S × S′) on this buyer, with the modifi-
cation that whenever the buyer would have received an item i from the support of S, instead she
will receive (or pay) money equal to vi. By independence, this modified mechanism on the buyer
with valuations drawn from S′ is IC and IR (a buyer with valuations S′ will choose the same menu
entry under the modified mechanism as a buyer with valuations S × S′ would have chosen under
the original mechanism) and we will obtain Rev(S × S′), but then have to settle for the items in
S. The most we stand to lose in the settlement is
∑
i v
+
i (each item i in S is transferred in full
whenever vi ≥ 0, and not transferred when vi < 0), so this amount is upper bounded in expectation
by Val+(S). Therefore, the optimal revenue from S′ is at least Rev(S×S′)−Val+(S), completing
the proof of the lemma.
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Lemma 8.3. (Subdomain Stitching) Let S be a product distribution over valuations, with support
X ⊆ Rm for some m ∈ N. Let X1, . . . ,Xk form a partition of X inducing conditional distributions
S(1), . . . , S(k), respectively, and let sj = Px∼S [x ∈ Xj ]. Then
Rev(S) ≤
k∑
j=1
sjRev(S
(j))
Intuitively, Subdomain Stitching says that revenue can only increase if we sell to each subdomain
separately, since we can use a different mechanism for each subdomain that specializes in extracting
the welfare from that customer segment.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 8.3. Let M be an optimal mechanism obtaining Rev(S), and for any
valuation distribution S′, let RevM (S′) denote the expected revenue obtained from mechanism
M when the buyer’s valuation is drawn from S′. Clearly Rev(S) =
∑k
j=1 sjRevM (S
(j)), and
furthermore for all j ∈ [k], RevM (S(j)) ≤ Rev(S(j)) since M is an IC-IR mechanism for selling to
S(j), completing the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 8.4. Let S be a product distribution over valuations, with support X ⊆ Rm for some
m ∈ N. Let X ′ be a subset of X inducing conditional distribution S′, and let s′ = Px∼S [x ∈ X ′].
Then
Rev(S) ≥ s′Rev(S′)
While Subdomain Stitching places an upper bound on Rev(S), Lemma 8.4 places a lower bound
on Rev(S) based on the optimal revenue of any single subdomain.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 8.4. Consider an optimal mechanism for S′, and extend this to an IC-
IR mechanism on S by allowing the buyer to report a value in X ′ maximizing her utility. With
probability s′, the buyer’s valuation will actually be drawn from S′ and we will obtain revenue
Rev(S′); otherwise, we still earn a non-negative revenue, since the mechanism never admits a
negative payment. Therefore, the optimal revenue for S is at least s′Rev(S′), completing the proof
of the lemma.
Lemma 8.5. Let S be a product distribution over m independent (potentially negative) valuations,
for some m ∈ N. Then
Rev(S) ≤ m · SRev(S)
While selling m items together can definitely be better than selling them separately, this lemma
tells us it can be no more than m times better.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 8.5. We proceed by induction. The statement is trivial when m = 1. Now,
suppose we have proven the statement for m valuations, and we will prove it for m+ 1 valuations.
Partition the support X ⊆ Rm+1 of S into X1 and X2, where X1 := {x ∈ X : x1 ≥ max{xj , 0} ∀ j =
2, . . . ,m+ 1} and X2 := X \ X1. Let s1 denote the probability a value sampled from S lies in X1,
and let S1 be its distribution conditioned on this event. Define s2, S2 respectively. Subdomain
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stitching tells us Rev(S) ≤ s1Rev(S(1)) + s2Rev(S(2)). Our goal is to separately show that
s1Rev(S
(1)) ≤ (m+ 1)SRev(S1) and s2Rev(S(2)) ≤ (m+ 1)SRev(S−1).
Now, applying Marginal Mechanism on S(1) and multiplying both sides of the inequality by s1,
we get s1Rev(S
(1)) ≤ s1Val+(S(1)−1) + s1Rev(S(1)1 ). By considering a distribution that samples
v ∼ S but only outputs v1, we can use Lemma 8.4 to show that s1Rev(S(1)1 ) ≤ Rev(S1). To bound
Val+(S
(1)
−1), consider the following mechanism for selling just item 1: sample v−1 ∼ S−1, and set the
price to be maxm+1i=2 {max{vi, 0}}. Since the buyer’s valuation is drawn from S1, by independence, we
get a sale with probability exactly s1. Furthermore, max
m+1
i=2 {max{vi, 0}} ≥ 1m
∑m+1
i=2 max{vi, 0},
so conditioned on us getting a sale, the expected payment is at least 1mVal
+(S
(1)
−1). We have proven
Rev(S1) ≥ s1mVal+(S
(1)
−1), hence s1Rev(S
(1)) ≤ (m+ 1)Rev(S1) = (m+ 1)SRev(S1), as required.
It remains to bound s2Rev(S
(2)), and using Marginal Mechanism and Lemma 8.4 in the same
way as before, we obtain that it is no more than s2Val
+(S
(2)
1 ) +Rev(S−1). Consider the following
mechanism for selling items 2, . . . ,m+1: sample v1 ∼ S1, and set the individual price for each item
2, . . . ,m+ 1 to be max{v1, 0}. Note that the probability of getting at least one sale is less than s2,
since even when there is some j = 2, . . . ,m + 1 such that v1 < max{xj , 0}, it is possible for both
v1, xj to be negative. However, in this case max{v1, 0} = 0, so not getting a sale is still equivalent
to getting at least one sale for max{v1, 0}. Therefore, we can think of it as we get at least one
sale with probability s2, in which case we earn in expectation at least Val
+(S
(2)
1 ). We have proven
that s2Val
+(S
(2)
1 ) ≤ SRev(S−1), and by the induction hypothesis Rev(S−1) ≤ m ·SRev(S−1), so
s2Rev(S
(2)) ≤ (m+ 1)SRev(S−1).
Putting everything together, we have Rev(S) ≤ (m + 1)(SRev(S1) + SRev(S−1)) = (m +
1)SRev(S), completing the induction and the proof of the lemma.
Using these lemmas, we decompose the revenue of the initial distribution D in the same way as
[BILW14]:
Rev(D) ≤
∑
A⊆[n]
pARev(DA)
≤
∑
A⊆[n]
pA
(
Val+(DCA) +Rev(D
T
A)
)
≤
∑
A⊆[n]
pAVal
+(DC∅ ) +
∑
A⊆[n]
pARev(D
T
A)
= Val+(DC∅ ) +
∑
A⊆[n]
pARev(D
T
A)
where the first inequality is Subdomain Stitching, the second inequality is Marginal Mechanism,
the third inequality is immediate from the definition of DCA , and the equality is a consequence of∑
A⊆[n] pA = 1.
Now, for all A ⊆ [n] such that pA > 0, Lemma 8.5 tells us that Rev(DTA) ≤ |A|SRev(DTA) =
33
|A|∑i∈A SRev(DTi ). Lemma 8.4 tells us that SRev(DTi ) ≤ ripi , where pi 6= 0 since pA > 0, so∑
A⊆[n]
pARev(D
T
A) ≤
∑
A⊆[n]
pA|A|
∑
i∈A
ri
pi
=
n∑
i=1
ri
∑
A3i
|A|pA
pi
∑
A3i |A|pApi is the expected number of items in their tails conditioned on item i being in its tail,
so it is equal to 1 +
∑
j 6=i pj . Thus
∑
A⊆[n]
pARev(D
T
A) ≤
n∑
i=1
ri
(
1 +
∑
j 6=i
pj
)
= 1 +
n∑
j=1
pj
∑
i 6=j
ri
= 1 +
n∑
j=1
pj(1− rj)
We will use τ to denote the quantity
∑n
i=1 pi(1− ri). It is immediate that τ ≤
∑n
i=1 pi ≤ 1, but
we can get a stronger bound for the welfare of the core if we don’t immediately apply the inequality
τ ≤ 1. We have
Rev(D) ≤ Val+(DC∅ ) + 1 + τ (10)
Before we proceed, one final lemma we will need later is:
Lemma 8.6. Let Y be a random variable distributed over [0, 1] and suppose y(1− F (y)) is upper
bounded by some value v ∈ [0, 1]. Then Var(Y ) ≤ 2v.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 8.6.
Var(Y ) = E[Y 2]− E[Y ]2
≤ E[Y 2]
=
∫ 1
0
P[Y 2 ≥ y]dy
=
∫ 1
0
P[Y ≥ √y]dy
≤
∫ 1
0
v√
y
dy
= 2v
where the second inequality uses the fact that the Myerson revenue for Y is upper bounded by
v.
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8.3 A Tighter Bound for the Welfare of the Core
The main observation behind our improvement is that for τ to be large (and the above bound
to be weak), the tail probabilities must be large. However, we will choose the price of the grand
bundle, Pt, to be at most 2, so that whenever 2 or more valuations lie in their tails, the customer
is guaranteed to want to buy the bundle (and dispose of items for which her valuation is negative).
Thus
P[∑x+i <Pt] = p∅ · Px∼D∅ [∑x+i <Pt] + ∑
|A|=1
pA · Px∼DA [∑x+i <Pt] + ∑
|A|≥2
pA · (0)
≤
(
p∅ +
∑
|A|=1
pA
)
· Px∼DC∅ [
∑
x+i <Pt]
=
( n∏
i=1
(1− pi) +
n∑
i=1
pi
∏
j 6=i
(1− pj)
)
· Px∼DC∅ [
∑
x+i <Pt] (11)
where the inequality comes from the fact that the probability of
∑
x+i being less than the bundle
price is greater conditioned on no items being in the tail, than conditioned on some item being in
the tail. We used independence to compute the probabilities in the final expression, which we will
bound in the following way:
Lemma 8.7. Let p1, . . . , pn, r1, . . . , rn be real numbers satisfying 0 ≤ pi ≤ ri and
∑n
i=1 ri = 1. Let
τ =
∑n
i=1 pi(1− ri). Then
n∏
i=1
(1− pi) +
n∑
i=1
pi
∏
j 6=i
(1− pj) ≤
5
4 + τ
eτ
This is the key inequality that enables our improved ratio and its proof requires new analysis.
Note that we do indeed have the condition pi ≤ ri in our case, since by Lemma 8.4 ri ≥ piRev(DTi ),
and Rev(DTi ) must be at least 1 when D
T
i is distributed over (1,∞).
Proof. Proof of Lemma 8.7. We will first prove
3
4
·
n∏
i=1
(1− pi) +
n∑
i=1
pi
∏
j 6=i
(1− pj) ≤ 1 + τ
eτ
(12)
Assume that pi < 1 for all i ∈ [n]; the lemma is trivially true otherwise because we would have
LHS = 1 and τ = 0. Since τ =
∑n
i=1 pi(1− ri) and 1− x ≤ e−x, it suffices to prove
3
4
·
n∏
i=1
(1− pi) +
n∑
i=1
pi
∏
j 6=i
(1− pj) ≤
(
1 +
n∑
i=1
pi(1− ri)
) n∏
i=1
(1− pi(1− ri))
which is equivalent to
3
4
+
n∑
i=1
pi
1− pi ≤
(
1 +
n∑
i=1
(pi − piri)
) n∏
i=1
(1 +
piri
1− pi )
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Observe that the RHS is at least(
1 +
n∑
i=1
(pi − piri)
)(
1 +
n∑
i=1
piri
1− pi
)
= 1 +
n∑
i=1
(pi − piri)(1− pi) + piri
1− pi +
( n∑
i=1
pi(1− ri)
)( n∑
i=1
piri
1− pi
)
= 1 +
n∑
i=1
pi
1− pi −
n∑
i=1
p2i (1− ri)
1− pi +
( n∑
i=1
pi(1− ri)
)( n∑
i=1
piri
1− pi
)
= 1 +
n∑
i=1
pi
1− pi −
n∑
i=1
p2i (1− ri)2
1− pi +
∑
i 6=j
pi(1− ri) · pjrj
1− pj
so it remains to prove
n∑
i=1
p2i (1− ri)2
1− pi −
∑
i 6=j
pi(1− ri) · pjrj
1− pj ≤
1
4
But pi ≤ ri for all i ∈ [n], so the LHS is at most
∑n
i=1 p
2
i (1− pi), which can be seen to be at most
1
4 , since pi(1− pi) is always at most 14 and
∑n
i=1 pi ≤ 1.
Also, since τ ≤ ∑ni=1 pi, e−τ ≥ exp(−∑ni=1 pi) ≥ ∏ni=1(1 − pi). Multiplying by 14 and adding
to (12), we complete the proof of the lemma.
8.4 Applying Cantelli’s Inequality
To bound Px∼DC∅ [
∑
x+i < Pt], we want to show that
∑
x+i concentrates around its mean, where
valuation xi is drawn from its conditional core distribution D
C
i for all i ∈ [n]. Note that y(1−Fxi(y))
is bounded above by ri for all y ∈ [0, 1]; otherwise SRev(DCi ) > ri =⇒ SRev(Di) > ri which is a
contradiction. Hence y(1− Fx+i (y)) is also bounded above by ri and we can invoke Lemma 8.6 to
get Varxi∼DCi (x
+
i ) ≤ 2ri for all i ∈ [n]. By independence, Varx∼DC∅ (
∑
x+i ) =
∑n
i=1 Varx∼DC∅ (x
+
i ) ≤∑n
i=1 2ri = 2 and we have successfully bounded the variance of the quantity we are interested in.
At this point, it is common in the literature to see an application of Chebyshev’s inequality
(e.g. [BB99, FN06, HN12, BILW14]). However, since we are only interested in the lower tail, we
can actually use Cantelli’s one-sided inequality (Lemma 3.1), which optimizes a shift parameter to
obtain an improved bound for a single tail.
Now, note that Ex∼DC∅ [
∑n
i=1 x
+
i ] = Val
+(DC∅ ) by definition. Also, it will be convenient to write
the bundle price as Pt = α ·Val+(DC∅ ), for some α ∈ [0, 1] (we would never want α > 1 since then
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the price would be greater than the mean and it would be impossible to use Cantelli). Then
Px∼DC∅ [
∑
x+i <Pt] = Px∼DC∅
[ n∑
i=1
x+i −Val+(DC∅ ) < −(1− α)Val+(DC∅ )
]
≤
Varx∼DC∅ (
∑
x+i )
Varx∼DC∅ (
∑
x+i ) + (1− α)2Val+(DC∅ )2
≤ 2
2 + (1− α)2Val+(DC∅ )2
where the first inequality is Cantelli’s inequality, and the second inequality comes from our variance
bound above. So long as we choose Pt ≤ 2, we can use (11), and combined with Lemma 8.7 we get
P[∑x+i <Pt] ≤ min{1.25 + τeτ , 1} · 22 + (1− α)2Val+(DC∅ )2
and hence the expected revenue from selling the grand bundle at price α ·Val+(DC∅ ) is at least
α ·Val+(DC∅ ) ·
(
1−min{1.25 + τ
eτ
, 1
} · 2
2 + (1− α)2Val+(DC∅ )2
)
Recall from (10) that Rev(D) ≤ Val+(DC∅ ) + 1 + τ . While τ could take on any value in [0, 1], we
can choose the price of the bundle based on τ and Val+(DC∅ ) by adjusting α ∈ [0, 1].
Case 1. If Val+(DC∅ ) ≤ 3.2, then Rev(D) ≤ 3.2 + 1 + 1 = 5.2 · SRev(D) is immediate and we
can just sell the items individually.
Case 2. If 3.2 < Val+(DC∅ ) ≤ 4, then we will choose α = 12 which guarantees Pt ≤ 2. Thus
BdcRev(D) ≥ Val+(DC∅ ) ·
1
2
(
1−min{1.25 + τ
eτ
, 1
} · 2
2 + (1− 12)2(3.2)2
)
It can be shown with calculus (or numerically) that:
Proposition 8.8. For all τ ∈ [0, 1], 2
(
1−min{1.25+τeτ , 1} · 22+(1− 1
2
)2(3.2)2
)−1
+ (1 + τ) < 5.2, with
the maximum of ≈ 5.1952 occuring at the unique positive τ satisfying 1.25+τeτ = 1.
Hence Val+(DC∅ ) ≤ (4.2− τ)BdcRev(D). Substituting into (10), we get
Rev(D) ≤ (4.2− τ)BdcRev(D) + (1 + τ)SRev(D)
≤ 5.2 ·max{SRev(D),BdcRev(D)}
as desired.
Case 3. If 4 < Val+(DC∅ ), then we will still choose α =
1
2 . We no longer have Pt ≤ 2, so we
have to use the weaker bound Px∼D[
∑
x+i < Pt] ≤ Px∼DC∅ [
∑
x+i < Pt]. However, applying Cantelli
yields
Px∼DC∅ [
∑
x+i <Pt] ≤
2
2 + (1− 12)2(4)2
=
1
3
so BdcRev(D) ≥ Val+(DC∅ ) · 12(1− 13). We get Rev(D) ≤ 3 ·BdcRev(D) + (1 + τ)SRev(D) <
5.2 ·max{SRev(D),BdcRev(D)}, completing the proof of Theorem 4.1.
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9 Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 4.3
It is immediate that the optimal revenue from PC is 2ρ, attained by selling individual items at
any price in [1, 2]. Next, we would like to argue that the optimal revenue from PB is also 2ρ. If
we offer the bundle at 2, it is guaranteed to get bought if either valuation realizes to 2 or both
valuations realize to a positive number, and won’t get bought otherwise. Therefore the revenue is
2(ρ2 + 2(1− ρ)ρ2) = 2ρ.
We can do equally well by offering the bundle at 3, and any other price is inferior.
Lemma 9.1. The optimal revenue from PB is 2ρ, attained by setting a bundle price of 2 or 3.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 9.1. Let z denote the price of the bundle. We will systematically analyze
all the cases over 1 ≤ z ≤ 4 and show that the maximum revenue of 2ρ is attained at z = 2 and
z = 3.
Case 1. Suppose 1 ≤ z ≤ 2. Let us condition on the realization y of the first valuation. If y = 0,
then we get a sale with probability ρz . If y ∈ [1, z), then we get a sale so long as the second valuation
realizes to a positive number, which occurs with probability 1−ρ. If y ≥ z, then the first valuation
alone is enough to guarantee a bundle sale. The expected revenue is
z
(
(1− ρ)ρ
z
+ (ρ− ρ
z
)ρ+
ρ
z
)
= 2ρ+ (z − 2)ρ2
which is clearly maximized at z = 2, in which case the revenue is 2ρ.
Case 2. Suppose 2 < z ≤ 3. Let us condition on the realization y of the first valuation. If y = 0,
then we have no chance of selling the bundle. If y ∈ [1, z − 1], then we get a sale when the other
valuation is at least z− y. Since z− y ∈ [1, 2], the probability of this occurring is ρz−y . If y ≥ z− 1,
then we get a sale so long as the other valuation realizes to a positive number, which occurs with
probability ρ. The total probability of getting a sale is∫ z−1
1
ρ
y2
ρ
z − ydy +
ρ
z − 1ρ
where the PDF of Y satisfies f(y) = ρ
y2
over [1, 2). Using partial fractions, the antiderivative of
1
y2(z−y) can be computed to be
1
z
(
ln y − ln(z − y)
z
− 1
y
)
as demonstrated in the proof of [HN12, lem. 6]. Therefore, the definite integral evaluates to
ρ2
(
2 ln(z − 1)
z2
+
2
z
− 1
z − 1
)
and the expected revenue is
zρ2
(
2 ln(z − 1)
z2
+
2
z
− 1
z − 1 +
1
z − 1
)
= 2ρ2
(
ln(z − 1)
z
+ 1
)
However, ln(z−1)z is a strictly increasing function on (2, 3], so this expression is uniquely maximized
at z = 3 where it equals 2ρ2( ln 23 + 1) = 2ρ.
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Case 3. Suppose 3 ≤ z ≤ 4. Let us condition on the realization y of the first valuation. If y < z−2,
then we have no chance of selling the bundle. Otherwise, the probability of getting a sale is ρz−y ,
since z − y ∈ [1, 2]. The total probability of getting a sale is∫ 2
z−2
ρ
y2
ρ
z − y +
ρ
2
ρ
z − 2
and the integral evaluates to
ρ2
(
2 ln 2− 2 ln(z − 2)
z2
+
1
z(z − 2) −
1
2z
)
Therefore, the expected revenue is
zρ2
(
2 ln 2− 2 ln(z − 2)
z2
+
1
z(z − 2) −
1
2z
+
1
2(z − 2)
)
= 2ρ2
(
ln 2− ln(z − 2)
z
+
1
z − 2
)
ln 2−ln(z−2)
z +
1
z−2 is a strictly decreasing function on [3, 4], so this expression is uniquely maximized
at z = 3.
Now, consider the strategy of offering either item for 2 or the bundle for the discounted price
of 3. Note that if buying the bundle is non-negative utility for the customer, then buying either
individual item cannot be higher utility, since the price savings is one and the value of the item lost
is at least one (recall that the firm gets to break ties in a way that favors itself). Hence there is
no cannibalization of bundle sales from individual sales and we earn revenue at least 2ρ. However,
when exactly one valuation realizes to a positive number (in which case we have no chance of selling
the bundle), we still have a 12 conditional probability of selling that individual item. Hence the
revenue from Mixed Bundling is 2ρ+ 2(2(1− ρ)ρ2) = 2ρ(2− ρ).
The relative gain over both the PC revenue and the PB revenue is 2− ρ = 3+2 ln 23+ln 2 , completing
the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Remark 9.2. A motivating example for our construction is a small modification of the earlier best-
known example from [HN12]: consider a distribution that takes on values 0, 1, 2 with probabilities
1
9 ,
4
9 ,
4
9 , respectively. Let D be the instance consisting of two independent copies of this distribution.
Then it can be shown that the optimal PC revenue is 169 (attained at individual prices 1 or 2), the
optimal PB revenue is 169 (attained at bundle price 2 or 3), and the optimal revenue is at least
160
81 (attained at individual prices 2 and bundle price 3), achieving a ratio of
9
10 . [HN12] had the
probabilities be 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 instead, achieving a ratio of
12
13 .
10 Appendix D: Example where BSP Performs Poorly
Consider a firm that is bundling a higher-profit-margin, lower-valuation good with a low-profit-
margin, high-valuation good. This is a common occurrence, for example when video games are
bundled with a console, which we will hereinafter refer to as item 1 and item 2, respectively. Item 1
costs zero to produce and has a valuation uniform on [0,1]; item 2 costs 4.5 to produce and has
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a valuation uniform on [0,5] and independent from item 1. Most of the welfare comes from the
lower-valuation item: the expected welfare for item 1 and item 2 are 0.5 and 0.025, respectively.
The optimal deterministic profit is ≈ 0.265, attained by offering item 1 at 0.51, item 2 at 4.83,
and the bundle at the discounted price of 5.13.
The optimal BSP pricing charges 4.83 for a single item and 5.03 for both items, earning only
19% of the deterministic optimum. This example highlights the issue with BSP: it cannot afford to
charge a low price for a single item if any item has a high production cost. However, most of the
potential profit could be coming from offering lower-valuation items at low prices! [CLS08] bypass
such examples in their numerical experiments, assuming that all items have a low cost compared
to its mean valuation.
PBDC offers item 1 at 0.51, item 2 at 5.01, and the bundle at 5.01—which is the right idea and
earns 99.1% of the deterministic optimum. Interestingly, even the analytical solution provided by
[Bha13], which computes the optimal deterministic pricing when there are two independent uniform
distributions and costs, is less effective than PBDC on this example. The solution from [Bha13]
only attains 97.5% of the deterministic optimum for this example, because it requires a bit of linear
approximation.
Optimal bundling is an intricate problem even in the case of two independent uniform distri-
butions, so a simple pricing heuristic as robust as PBDC is invaluable. In fact, for this example
PBDC recommends Partial Mixed Bundling, which is a Mixed Bundling scheme where one of the
items, in this case item 2 (the high-cost low-welfare item), is never sold individually. This matches
the intuition that the seller should add item 1 (the low-cost high-welfare item) to item 2 in order
to increase the total amount customer is willing to pay (see Proposition 1 in [Bha13]). BSP, on the
other hand, does not perform well: it recommends a Partial Mixed Bundling scheme where item 1
is never sold individually.
40
